Plane 2 manifests are hashed with SHA-256 over canonical JSON and looked up deterministically by horizon, route, and policy version.
QICR / Plane 2
QICR Plane 2
Plane 2 is the soft field: a content-addressed adapter registry with deterministic selection and sealed ADAPTER_SELECTION records. Plane 1 remains the only permission layer.
The adapter selection is sealed into the chain before CANDIDATE_ACTION. evaluateQicrCandidate is unchanged and remains the only verdict path.
ADAPTER_SELECTION records sit alongside CANDIDATE_ACTION, IMMACULATE_DECISION, ACTION_COMPLETE, and TAMPER_CHECK. Tampering localizes at the altered record.
Route governed
What Plane 2 Adds Publicly
Plane 2 narrows the candidate distribution Q emits, conditioned on a content-addressed adapter manifest. The selection is auditable, not authoritative. The thesis (QICR design v0.2, June 2026) names this as the 'governed processor lanes' framing for the soft field.
- Manifests are SHA-256 content-addressed; same logical manifest re-exported with different key order has the same hash.
- Selection rule in v0 is closed: deterministic-first-match over a lex-sorted manifest list.
- No matching manifest returns a null selection (no-bias fallback) — the runtime never crashes on a missing adapter.
Route governed
What Plane 2 Does Not Do
Plane 2 cannot loosen a Plane 1 DENY. The two-plane separation is enforced architecturally, not by convention. A bias-toward-grant adapter cannot turn an unregistered-route DENY into an ALLOW. The selection record is sealed so a verifier can prove which conditioning was active for any decision.
- Plane 2 changes the proposal distribution; it does not vote on the verdict.
- Bias vector values are not sealed — only the manifest hash and lookup tuple are recorded.
- Operator authors manifests in the Immaculate harness under apps/harness/adapters/ and supplies them per-call via plane2Manifests.